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Virtuosity is a concept that has the double advantage of being transverse with respect to 
different musical genres and of pointing at performance2 – at music that is not fixed by the 
score. These are two characteristics that directly refer to approaches developed by Derek 
Scott, which he has done by focusing, as I intend to do, on the nineteenth century – a period 
when great divides were established.3 These divides still govern current musical practices, 
and perhaps even more, the academic disciplines that target them. In the course of the 
questioning of the opposition between popular and art music as carried out by critical 
musicology,4 and mirroring its focus on the notion of performance,5 I have decided to pay 
respect to the way musicians themselves have taken on the constitutional ambivalence of 
virtuosity. Indeed, for them this refers less to the specific property some types of music or 
artists possess than to a distanced attraction – a dangerous temptation, an impossible 
injunction of which they need to be wary. 
Undoubtedly, virtuosity is part of indigenous musicians’ vocabulary – it signifies the 
height of a musician’s skills or the seductive prowess of an illusionist. Used both by 
specialists and by amateurs, the word is powerful in its critical load, albeit positive or 
negative: it enables the listener to qualify and disqualify an interpreter, to honour an artist or 
to despise another. There is the matter of the ‘virtuosity-effect’, which this use of the word, 
accusing or laudatory, demonstrates. I would posit that this effect is able to guide us into the 
domain of the mysterious issues of performance. My contribution to this volume is therefore 
not an analytical effort to afford virtuosity a musical and sociological definition that would 
be as definite as possible (and that indeed is what the word definition suggests), nor to 
                                                
1 A first version of this chapter was published in French in an online journal: http://ateliers.revues.org/8764 (Hennion 
2011). The chapter has been translated by Anne Paterson Farina and Stan Hawkins. 
2 I note that the English word ‘performance’ is far more relevant than the French usage, which expresses interpretation, 
or worse, execution. 
3 Scott (1989, 2008). 
4 This theme was introduced in the 1980s by scholars, such as J. Kerman and A. Durant, gaining momentum in size and 
content through an alternative promotion of popular culture (e.g. Leppert and McClary 1987, Frith 1996, Whiteley et al., 
2004).  
5 Typically, performance studies are divided because of the dual meaning of the word: a reference to theatre taken as a 
model of self-expression (Jackson 2004); and the idea of the necessary performativity of a social identity (Schechner 
2002). This opposition – ‘life as performance’ vs. ‘performance as life’ – seems less an ambiguity that requires resolving 
than a founding ambivalence that makes the word interesting. All depends on whether one takes theatrical performance 
just as a case study or, conversely, as Judith Butler did, an interest in performance as the production of oneself or of 
collectives that, in that way, we allow to exist, we realize, we produce – all the words filled with the same dual meaning, 
referring both to the world of performance and to a pragmatism of existence and identity (Butler 1997, 2005). 
provide it with a sense that is stable and independent of situations: for this is exactly what 
virtuosity, by playing with boundaries, continually seeks to bypass. It would also be 
somewhat problematic, considering that virtuosity tries to express just the opposite: to give 
voice to a sense of instability and the fleeting moment by accepting as a criterion the bliss of 
a performance as nothing but its radical dependence from the present situation.6 While 
extending the boundaries that separate musical genres, my purpose is rather to question two 
contrasting definitions of virtuosity that are strongly present in debates and judgments. 
On the one hand, virtuosity has been considered rather negatively as a performance aimed 
at a public that outwardly demonstrates exception agility in terms of instrumental or vocal 
technique, especially as related to speed of execution. Such displays are both admired as 
demonstrations of a divine gift and condemned as a diabolical perversion of musical 
performance. On the other hand, pushing things to their limits is a pressing need in musical 
practice, which implies that virtuosity is a more complex issue. This involves an internal 
musical urge from within. It is perceived as a corporeal and risky litmus test of the 
mysterious power of music and musicians’ talents in a way that forces them to extreme 
points where they not only reveal their drive, but also topple a music event into states whose 
boundaries are less easy to determine. This refers to states that words are less capable of 
defining: primary emotion, collective intoxication and moments of trance.7 
As is evident from this very formulation, these two ways of describing virtuosity are not 
as contradictory as they might seem. Sorting them out (‘virtuosity for its own sake’ vs. 
‘virtuosity in the service of a work’, to coin a cliché) is easier to do ex post, once a concert 
has ended, than during the course of performance when the status of what is at stake at the 
moment is nothing but obvious, nor is the very fact of evaluating whether it is a success or a 
failure: how, why, and to what end are we to distinguish between the emotion caused by 
incredible skills and one’s fascination with a rare talent, or by that sense of being carried 
away by a whirlwind of music, an intense ‘breakaway’ when music finally no longer exists 
as a score or a ‘piece’, but rather as an emotion; when it emerges from the moment as a 
flicker? It is not what is played, but what comes out of fingers and bodies in motion, 
uncontrolled, the speed and contrasts of which make the material of sound crack, stripping 
the screen of its notes. 
 
If You Have to Ask What It Is … 
 
Theoretically, there is a great difficulty in finding the right register through which to 
address intermediate words, such as virtuosity (as is the case for words such as ‘grace’ or 
‘presence’). They accompany and describe a common experience with which they are 
familiar. Then, it is impossible to determine whether they help in analysis or whether they 
are directly involved in its accomplishment. They serve in analysing the phenomenon they 
refer to, but at the same time they put things in shape, they allow a grasping of it in some 
way that contributes to bringing it out. Certainly, this applies to all our categories, something 
ethnomethodology has taught us. However, what is interesting here are not the basics of the 
way any qualification operation runs. These are not the limits of any effort to put things into 
words insofar as, partly constituting the reality they are designating, they are reciprocally 
called to evolve with it. It is the peculiarity of certain odd words, such as virtuosity, that are 
suggestive but indefinable, resistant to formalization, as if they only made sense through 
                                                
6 Sudnow (1978). 
7 Rouget (1980). 
their own uncertainty and, far from giving them additional weight and efficiency, the effort 
made to find a more analytical or general basis for these ideas caused them to escape like 
water in a creek, leaving us void. 
Such evanescence – the way in which wear and tear takes its course – is in fact particular 
in every single case, although it is not necessarily the usual destiny of such musical 
categories. Instead, many other categories have provided musical performance with a 
framework that has been reinforced precisely because it gave rise to an intense collective 
task towards its definition, stabilization and clarification: genres and forms, and, of course, 
concert programmes and concert hall repertoires, as well as less institutionalized variables, 
such as the features of tempi, alternating moments of tension and relaxation, typification of 
instruments and timbres, postures and expressions expected from soloists, and so on. By 
contrast, this partial list suggests the strange and fragile position occupied by those other 
more synthetic but less precise words that seek to capture the ‘spirit’ of what is happening 
and not to delineate the elements that make it up. They are both more important and less 
self-confident, as if describing all at once the heart of a phenomenon and the impossibility of 
achieving it. ‘If you have to ask what jazz is, you’ll never know’, Louis Armstrong 
reportedly said. Soul or inspiration, feeling or virtuosity, saudade or ‘blue note’, prodigy or 
genius: while vocabulary changes with genres and musical styles, there is still a persistent 
need to pin down things beyond what is describable, and to put a word to those utterly 
unspeakable but decisive feelings. What we face here is the specific problem raised by these 
empty words that try to designate without designating, to indicate a question more than to 
mean anything whatsoever.8  
 
A Truth of Mechanics? 
 
While words such as swing or genius create a strong polarity between the letter and the 
spirit and between technical means and emotion, reinforcing this dualism, the paradox of 
virtuosity is that it aims to posit something about the ‘spirit of skill’; it suggests a part of the 
truth that exists in mechanics. Far from opposing art and its means, it speaks of what the art 
itself could be from within its means, or making the means an art itself. It thus recovers the 
older sense of the word art, which verges on technique: art is always in the art of making, in 
the art of doing, something which magicians and clowns remind us of in performances that 
are primarily a sideshow. There is yet another more historical path that emerges here: this 
involves a virtuosity that, in opposition to the aestheticism of art, sustains the skill and 
craftmanship that is central to a performance. Art is a bodily gesture, and not just a mental 
projection or the expression of one’s soul. In their oppositional directions, such dualistic 
formulae nevertheless miss what, in my view, the word virtuosity signifies: as I have already 
said, it is not as viable to isolate, separate or analyse performance trends as to hedge one’s 
bets on their secret junction; playing the game of an unlikely rapprochement in the alchemy 
of the moment. 
‘To hide art by very art’.9 One of the first tensions worth noting indeed draws the issue of 
virtuosity close to that of improvisation, of risk taking, of being on stage; all these unevenly 
mixed ingredients, taken together, are what constitute the power of a performance. This 
relationship is a reminder of an aspect I have only touched on so far; a strong constraint that 
weighs on the bliss of the sequences of breathtaking virtuosity as they determine the success 
                                                
8 Jankélévitch (1961). 
9 The formula is by Rameau, in the letter he wrote in 1827 to Houdar de La Motte in order to convince the playwriter to 
write a libretto for him (it has been published in Le Mercure de France, 1865). 
of a brilliant improvisation: the fact is that they move forward only when they are slightly 
concealed, producing their effect when they seem to arise from a moment.10 If they hint at 
too much sweat, if they seem too prepared, and if they give the impression of having been 
heard a hundred times, they rapidly lose their charm, dwindling to nothing short of pointless 
exercises. Furthermore, the speed that defines virtuosic quality is bound to be looked down 
on as soon as one becomes afraid of affording it too much importance: while it has little else 
to show but its acts to prove its point, these acts themselves are subject to assessments that 
cannot be grounded. 
 
Olympia the Doll … 
 
This prerequisite is severe; it forces virtuosity to break away from both the work that 
makes it possible and from the device that makes it attractive. One must receive it without 
entirely seeing it for what it is; the audience must not be overtly sensitive to the staging 
required by the performer. The problem is not so much the tedious side of a performance, 
which offers itself as fluidity incarnated, but rather its predictable aspect – seeing it from a 
mile away with the performer’s intention of knocking the socks off the receiver. One can 
observe strong but risky contiguities, which virtuosi sustain. In particular, two characters 
emerge as natural friends: 
1. Magicians, from whom virtuosi borrow many of their stage tricks, learn to 
know the ropes as well as peddlers’ tricks, which are so good at capturing attention; classical 
interpreters draw from tavern fiddlers, balalaika players, accordion dance musicians or bar 
pianists threading their devilish ragtimes. In so doing, they find out things that go against 
everything they have ever learned – the glamorous side of scales and arpeggios played one 
after the other on simple and repetitive canvasses at a frenetic pace, faster and faster, 
triggering the frenzy of the audience itself, quite unable to say whether it is carried away by 
the flood or whether it enjoys pretending to believe it is being carried away; these two states 
are hardly distant from one another! 
2. Automatons, whose virtuosi seem to seek mechanical perfection while fearing 
to be mistaken for being automatons – because the only appeal in the way they play resides 
in the fact that they perform features one might think only a machine could do, whereas they 
are human beings like you and me. 
There is no more brilliant idea than that of Offenbach’s librettists to stage a double play 
in the first of the Tales of Hoffmann with the doll Olympia: the confusion between a diva 
and an automaton is first used literally in the scenario. The poor Hoffmann is in love with 
the singer whose virtuosity he admires without knowing what everyone else knows – that 
she is only a doll. However, this confusion is also used by Offenbach metaphorically quite 
precisely because Olympia is played by a real singer, whereby her very skilful 
‘performance’ is applauded as the performance of an artist imitating an automaton, and not 
as that of a doll imitating an artist! In the background, even deeper in terms of metaphor, 
Offenbach is actually engaged by bitterly criticizing the prowess of coloratura singing with a 
dose of talent and humour: constantly playing around with crossing the boundaries between 
the automatic aspect and the virtuoso aspect of the soprano’s shrill notes, he presents the 
audience with a real bravura, which indeed exists in all coloratura-sopranos’ repertoire (at 
least for those who are able to deliver it). And in the same gesture, a comic parody of these 
operatic arias – a parody whose plot entirely rests on the mechanical and artificial character 
                                                
10 See the issue of Tracés (2011) dedicated to improvisation. 
of these arpeggios that shatter before starting off again once the key in the doll’s back has 
been rewound. Finally, with no solution of continuity besides that of the robotic qualities of 
the virtuoso doll, the stage reveals its magician, and evil one at that. For behind the doll 
there is its creator, the shady magician who amazes the complicit audience, deceiving the all 
too poetical Hoffmann.11 
 
Rascher und rascher … 
 
Velocity, a path of large intervals within very short periods of time, escalations of 
ornamentation and variations, notes doubled an octave apart … those processes, fully 
exploiting the characteristics of each instrument or its limits, demonstrate virtuosity that is 
necessary for its display. They also constitute what reveals vanity, quickly toppling it into its 
opposite, pointless acrobatics, soulless agility. The case of classical music is interesting in 
that it has greatly increased in tension, in terms of this ambivalence of virtuosity; whereas 
popular music has managed it with good nature and indulgence: ‘come on, minstrels, just 
play for us!’ The Romantic aesthetic expression of the subject, however, amplifies the 
discomfort aroused by virtuosity, whose illusionist facet articulates poorly in a quest for 
truth in works that are demanding. The obvious use of artifice, which was no problem as 
related to classical aesthetics,12 has to be thoroughly reworked; it has to be contained in 
order to be made endurable. Yet, once it is perceived as being ‘dedicated’ to art, is virtuosity 
a protective barrier against its excesses, or a comfortable denial behind which one can, 
without scruples, give oneself up to it? It is difficult to decide. But for sure, it was at the very 
moment the theme of the necessary subjection of virtuosity became commonplace that it 
took on far unknown dimensions, particularly through the development of the modern piano 
in the early nineteenth century: that was the moment when in high society circles and on the 
stages all over Europe Czerny, Moscheles, Chopin, Thalberg, Alkan, and eventually Franz 
Liszt (the one who was to become the very epitome of an evil and brilliant virtuosity) took 
their places. 
In depending on genres and instruments, it seems to me that these Romantic artists used 
two different approaches to deal with virtuosity. The first involves mainly the aesthetic. The 
contempt that Schumann could not help feeling towards Liszt – despite the generous support 
Liszt gave him – perfectly exemplifies this attitude. Schumann, the man for whom there 
were no laws in art other than those of morality,13 had a hard time coping with 
exhibitionism, seduction, taste for popular success, pursuit of the brilliant effect, indeed all 
the features he perceived in Liszt’s character and in his music. The problem is far from 
simple, because it is not a matter of pushing away the difficulty of writing and performing 
works, which composers such as Chopin or Schumann did take to an extreme as much as 
Liszt (barely had Schumann written Als rasch wie möglich14 at the beginning of a piece than 
the same Schumann had added, a few staves later, Rascher und rascher …), but rather it is 
to obey to the letter the absolute injunction of ‘may the interpreter serve the work, not the 
work serve the interpreter’. 
                                                
11 Musical abstracts illustrating the case can easily be found on internet (they are inserted in Hennion 2011). Here, see 
for instance, Natalie Dessay’s performance in ‘Les oiseaux dans la charmille’ at the Bastille Opéra in 1992 (staging by 
Roman Polanski). 
12 To whom artifice, on the contrary, is the most direct path towards Nature (Kintzler 1983). 
13 Cf. in the ‘Musical Rules at Home and in Life’ he wrote as a Preface to his Album für die Jugend for the piano (1848): 
‘The moral laws are also those of Art’. 
14 ‘As fast as possible.’ 
Declined in a thousand ways, this rhetoric of the means and the goal – or for that matter 
the master and the slave – becomes an indispensable topos when it comes to virtuosity. 
Arthur Rubinstein used it cunningly while reaping all the benefits of fame and success, 
repeating ‘with modesty’ that performers only had talent while composers had genius. This 
reminder rapidly sounds like a somewhat handy alibi, a position with no opposition that each 
and every one ensures he occupies himself while accusing others of giving in to the easy 
way. Nevertheless, this complex topic cannot be reduced so simply: at the very heart of 
composition, it refers to a very strong requirement – in the great Romantics’ works – to that 
of a maximum coherence among all musical parameters. This is the first response of 
classical music to virtuosity, and however difficult they may be, Schumann’s pieces or, in a 
less unambiguous way, those of Chopin15 are not virtuosity pieces. 
So, what does this mean? I have no intention of taking this statement for granted, but 
rather to see if it leads to the possible illustration of technical differences in the form of 
pianistic writing itself. The idea has a relevance, even though I will not endeavour to prove 
or develop it in this context. It is that which the word composition, taken literally, expresses 
well: the opposite of a virtuoso piece is not necessarily an easy piece, or a work that 
foregoes exploiting the resources of techniques, but more an integrated piece, a piece whose 
various elements closely respond to each other and constitute one another. 
It is this vital distributed aspect of music that makes inappropriate the vocabulary of 
virtuosity. However, this vocabulary can be deployed without embarrassment in a musical 
space where, on the contrary, the variables are clearly separated: an easily recognizable 
melody on which one can make all imaginable variations (plus a few others …), a fixed 
harmonic grid on which one can improvise, a basic rhythm on which, say, Liszt could 
indulgently superimpose chromaticisms and demisemiquavers. Referring to Bach and 
Beethoven, Schumann would often insist that a melody is much more than what one can 
imagine: in more modern terms, one might say that to him, a melody is indeed distributed 
between (and no longer on) harmony, rhythm, figures that respond to one another. 
Conversely, harmony or form are not separable, but arise in successive layers by 
amplification to constitute one another and to com-pose one another: then there is no place 
any longer for the left hand droning an Alberti bass or striking its chords while the right 
hand spins in all directions! To say it in other terms, there is no longer a way to isolate a 
virtuoso line from its harmonic well-established framework, nor to hear it as the ornate 
variation of a given theme. In my opinion, this is precisely what undermines the idea of 
virtuosity, both under the composer’s pen and in the amateur’s ear.16 
All said and done, this should not force one to be fooled by art history, which is 
constantly rewritten ex post like the long and difficult path towards the demands, purities 
and autonomies that aesthetic conformism has become. The idea is only to note how, as 
ideals, this ascetic, puritan repression of effects for effects had an effect, which, in turn, 
deserves to be recognized and analysed: ideals such as these have made possible the 
invention of a new language, characterized by coherence, by maximum integration that, in 
                                                
15 Eigeldinger (2000). 
16 To get a musical idea of the point, one can compare György Cziffra playing Liszt’s Hungarian Rhapsody No. 3, and 
Martha Argerich in the ending of the third movement of Schumann’s Fantasy in C major Op.17, which is very difficult 
not because of Liszt’s lines, but because of everything occurring at once: a very fast and repeated rhythm jostling large 
arpeggio chords with both hands . The same ‘à la Schumann’ non-virtuosic virtuosity can be heard in ‘Aufschwung’, his 
Phantasiestucke Op.12 No. 2, and also in pieces by Chopin, such as the Study Op. 25 No. 11 in A minor, for instance 
played by Sviatoslav Richter. Chopin is of interest because he is somewhere between Liszt and Schumann: if there is 
obviously a clear opposition between chords and lines as in Liszt, his lines are closely linked and stress the percussive 
power of chords, which are not of the sort ‘in’ which twirling passages can be played. 
depriving virtuosity of much of its relevance, shifts the issue towards that of the overall 
difficulty of interpretation. The more popular or hedonistic aesthetics that these stringent 
requirements have repressed have no need to be defended, given their success. But neither 
can they be reduced to easy exploitations of existing processes. They also have to be 
elaborated through multiple channels. Incidentally, the continuities between art and popular 
musicians are striking as regards this matter. Virtuosity itself is so aligned with technical 
excellence that, when pursued, it never goes very far away. In the case of one of the more 
‘serious’ composers, Brahms, one never ceases, for instance, to hear the gypsy accents of the 
violin, which the skill of classical quartets had managed to erase and disembody till nothing 
was left but a heavenly voice. Conversely, when Ravel methodically runs counter to the 
canons of Modernism, when he rehabilitates waltz, descriptive music, programmes and the 
‘gypsy’ violin (inadvertently reasserting the value of virtuosity), it would be problematic to 
infer that his only aesthetic concern lies in the pleasure of impressing his public. 
 
‘Vissi d’arte’ 
 
There is a second way that classical musicians accommodated virtuosity that I wish to 
mention. As early as the nineteenth-century, well before the artists of the twentieth century’s 
ironic or iconoclastic posturing, Romantic composers were able to turn to other means than 
pure aesthetics to confine the virtuosity, to exploit it without allowing it to decimate the 
music: and the most important approach, in tandem with the previous, involved a resistance 
to this ‘virtuosity-effect’ by opposing the mixed richness of emotion, the never-ending quest 
for the expression of feeling, as in opera, rather than the uncompromising autonomy of a 
work. A priori, as a virtuosic development material, the voice had every reason to compete 
with the violin or the piano. It did not deprive itself of so doing.17 
Vocalizations, arpeggios, sostenuti, endless ornaments and cadenzas, singers rival each 
other in skill, stripping the works of composers who are powerless in limiting their excesses: 
here we are again facing the very words of the argument about virtuosity. However, in 
contrast with chamber or orchestral music, opera has never been under the influence of 
autonomous aesthetics, of which it is the absolute antithesis.18 Wagner’s revolutionary 
pretensions, which were to favour his Modernist annexation, targeted a total art, which was 
quite different: only a deaf person would not to hear the heterogeneous diversity of the 
effects that saturate his writing, both on stage and in the pit. As for other composers, from 
Mozart to Debussy, from Gounod to Verdi, from Mussorgsky to Strauss or to Berg, they all 
instinctively accommodated opera within another space, which consistently reversed the 
representations of ‘pure’ music: a mixture of ambiguity, entertainment and dance, where the 
bodily pleasure of voices, projection and identification eroticized characters, the place where 
the plot, the stage play and the words attempt, with variable success, to marry singing with 
the orchestra.19 One can understand that such an unlikely union can only last if it is armoured 
with conventions. The Modernists themselves, fascinated by this anti-model that opera 
                                                
17 There is a profusion of examples here. See e.g. Rossini’s ‘Una voce poco fa’ (‘A voice has not much power’!) in the 
Barber of Seville: 65 years before Olympia, already a ‘mise en abyme’ lesson, Rosina’s contest, sung for instance by 
Maria Callas in 1959. Or, again in the Barber, ‘Largo al factotum’, for instance by Thomas Hampson in 1992, for 
Rossini’s 200th anniversary, in which he acts as a clown and adds notes. 
18 Fulcher (1987). 
19 Hennion (2007a). 
shows them, have repeatedly promised its death, before rushing into its arms at the first 
opportunity.20  
And yet, also on this stage – a stage that is so far away from purifying asceticism and 
from art for art’s sake, so conducive to spectacular excess – virtuosity has had to surrender. 
The never ending fragility of Norma’s melodic ascent, the spellbinding power of Isolde’s 
complaint, Carmen’s sarcastic accents or La Traviata’s bloody tears: while requiring from 
singers an inordinate performance, they hardly evoke the idea of virtuosity. Just as Chopin’s 
Etudes, straight as an arrow despite their chromatic descents, or Schumann’s Fantasy, whose 
rhythm is impossible to maintain, it is not so much that these lyrical summits stand beyond 
the diagnosis of virtuosity, but rather that they make it obsolete, useless, that they outstrip it 
from itself. But they do it in ways that are contrary to those of the great Romantic piano 
composers, not by the rigour and coherence of a musical form, but through the tentative 
mobilization of an emotion that is both intimate and collective, leaning on all the age-old 
techniques of performance: the mythical narrative, the drama of love and death, the exposure 
of bodies and the painful tension of extreme performance. Then there is the impossibility of 
love profiled by the backdrop of a tragic chorus: from Orfeo to Lulu, we might ask which 
opera is the exception to the process? At the same time, this ageless canvas, this endless da 
capo is an opening that has no boundary, no background and no horizon. Is it still even 
music? What pleasure is there in hearing a long, shrill note, to listen to a tune for the 
thousandth time that one owns ten versions of, or to observe the accents and impetus of a 
voice with a magnified potential through extraordinary technical developments? Who can 
say what that ‘emotion’ exactly comprises – another of these intermediate words impossible 
to define. 
 
A well-tempered virtuosity 
 
Nothing prevents an amateur liking both nineteenth-century piano sonatas and Romantic 
operas. The abstraction of a musical language pushed to its limits, and the sensual and 
projective ambiguity of the great lyrical machine, do not exclude one another. Moreover, 
these genres are all laden with a thousand virtuoso feats. Nevertheless, in both cases, 
virtuosity has been pushed back to the fringes, or confined to a closely observed enclosure. 
While virtuosity is certainly present, the genre unfolds against it in a double sense, where 
the genre in question both leans against and opposes virtuosity. This founding gesture, 
which defines virtuosity by default after having stripped it of any aesthetic value, also 
disqualifies it in other genres, as if by contamination. Two centuries of Romantic then 
Modernist aesthetics have managed to turn it into some kind of primary background for our 
musical and dramatic instincts, which any self-respecting artistic practice has a duty to 
surpass. 
My point is that there is no reason for this to be so. It is quite possible to elaborate on the 
rigour of aesthetics, not in spite of virtuosity, but for it. By not relegating virtuosity to the 
margins of the definition of quality, but by making music arise from its effects, by starting 
from the virtuoso gesture to make it express what it can bring. This is worth repeating, I 
think, with an entire aesthetic tradition in mind: our frayed vision of virtuosity is not a 
necessity; it is first and foremost the effect of the dualistic vision of Romanticism, further 
amplified by Modernism. The more we adamantly oppose idea and matter, means and ends, 
mind and body, the more we impose a dichotomized musical space; between art and 
                                                
20 Hennion (2007b). 
technique, between the truth of an inner feeling and the artifice of the notes that express it. 
On the one hand, the work bequeathed by the genius; on the other hand, a humble servant 
who deciphers the composer’s mysterious ‘intentions’. This entire topology, which is so 
paradoxical when talking about the art of playing and performing, goes against a conception 
that is, instead, connected, continuous, articulating gesture and effect, confounding the work 
and its interpretation, unable to dissociate means and ends, and refusing to separate body and 
emotion. Yet, is that not that exactly the positive programme that one can build virtuosity 
upon? The assumption is not at all crazy; rather, it’s more a reassuring return of the 
repressed. When playing, the majority of classical performers continue to live what they 
deny, and keep connecting through their bodies what their minds believe they have severed. 
What they seek is the flexible, subtle articulation of a gesture that is to be made over and 
over again; this strives towards a music that is never there, which is far from the blinding 
clarity that too aptly separates the ‘score’21 from its ‘interpretation’. 
 
Giant Steps 
 
Which brings us to aesthetics. What happens if we leave the temples of classical music? 
Just think of flamenco, open-air dance music and the intoxication of accordions, or African 
drums: an intense emotion may occur – not beyond the prowess of the bodies, but within 
them. Flamenco is nothing but virtuosity, that of fingers on strings, that of the improvised 
melisma of a husky voice flying away and stroking the breaks of the rhythm, that of tap-
dancers’ heels slamming and speeding up, that of busts and bellies that swirl and arch, 
constantly bounced from the broadest movement to immobility lying in wait, and that of 
hands carving the air. Everything concerns the body in terms of deftness and difficulty, but 
who would have the idea of turning away from this physical tension to search for the source 
of the pleasure, and of looking instead for it in the intimacy of an inner soul or in the 
absolute beauty of a work? The moment, the place and the performance are there at centre 
stage. Music and emotion are but the same words made to express a single event, that which 
gives the present its density. 
My purpose in referring to flamenco is not to isolate a genre, which, like Asterix’s little 
Gallic village resisting the general invasion of form and pure emotion, would have preserved 
the rare cult of the virtuoso gesture, but rather to suggest from real examples that an 
aesthetic of virtuosity is possible; a positive, contemporary aesthetic that creates new worlds 
rather than an aesthetic by default. And this would not be to assign it exclusively to one 
music rather than another: but instead, to regard it as surreptitiously adhering to the noblest, 
the most sublime and the most sensitive genres. But dwelling on the flamenco may be too 
easy an example to prove the possibility of a bodily aesthetic: does the flamenco not typify 
the music of ‘the other’? one might say that I am just extending the dualism I wish to oppose 
between ‘them’ and ‘us’,22 between the popular and corporeality of popular music on the one 
side, and classical music, made of written works, on the other. Everyone seems content now 
to grant exoticism opposite qualities to those championed by the Christian West – the power 
of trance, the vitality of rites, the mobility of bodies, the intensity of a people, as reflected in 
music. Is the unsettling question really about wondering whether this ‘other’ music is 
beautiful? Who still doubts it? But what if this music did do what scholarly music does: 
                                                
21 The music score is, so revealingly, named ‘partition’, in French! 
22 Geertz (1988). 
what if ‘other’ music were also constructing a work of art, and were doing so by stressing 
even more the etymology of the word – working at having the ‘art work’, so to speak? 
To provide a positive answer, albeit without concluding, I want to make my point by 
turning to jazz – a genre that is partly other, at least when compared to the classical 
tradition. Yet it is an ‘other’ with its origins at the heart of our culture, and not its periphery. 
‘Mozart played by blacks’, people claimed when referring to ragtime. This is probably what 
resulted in jazz becoming a concentration of divergent forces. Jazz could be considered as 
representative of African Americans, and under the aegis of an illusory radicality, filed a few 
decades later on another shelf in the store of folklore or at the museum of ethnicities. 
Instead, jazz has incorporated all the ingredients of modern Western music, both in its 
forms, harmonies and instruments, and processes of mediation. Rapidly, jazz became radio 
and recorded music rather than music from plantations. It was black music played for white 
men, first for their entertainment, then as music approved of by the Europeans.23 Its 
accelerated history became the result of a succession of renunciations (of whatever could 
reduce it to a particularistic music) and adoptions (of anything that could integrate it into 
time and space). It only remains identifiable through a few, minimal but decisive traces: the 
blues, the improvised choruses, a frenetic pace. 
Returning to the central theme of this chapter, I would like to suggest that jazz may have 
invented something unique due to its intrinsic qualities: like classical music through its 
material, its format, its performance, but with only one small entity that makes all the 
difference – its emphasis on performance, not on the work.24 This has come about through a 
historical shift resulting in its transposition and transformation into a contemporary mould. 
Bebop is not flamenco precisely because of this internal resumption: it is played and dressed 
up in a Western manner. Moreover, it meets the requirement of the clean aesthetic carved 
out by Western music, concentrating on itself and aiming at the production of differentiated 
works. In this sense, it is obvious that jazz is a form of modern Western music, and not a 
traditional or ethnic music. Nor is it a popular music with a common cultural or social 
identity fixed by stable codes. Virtuosity in jazz is neither the proof of a collective 
performance made indistinct by the body through dance and ritual in the form of 
entertainment, nor is it the basic starting point from which music evolves. Let me say things 
again in a different way: whereas the mapping of the music of Western culture is granted by 
original scores, jazz privileges the act of playing, of engaging through exhilarating pleasure 
virtuoso sequences of scales and chords, and, as with flamenco, it is located in the here and 
now, in the collective heat of a public that is beside itself with joy. Yet, unlike flamenco, its 
sole concern is in the making of music:25 for jazz is a dedicated Western style – it has not so 
much rid itself of the notion of work as it has emphasized the work as being the performance 
itself. Take Coltrane, an artist in the modern sense of the word: he does not play ‘jazz’, but 
rather takes the risk of offering a separate version of the standard each time he performs. 
The issue I leave open is: in listening to Giant Steps (what a nice summary of the history 
of jazz, that title is!), what I hear is an aesthetic of virtuosity – a formula that has a meaning 
only provided one gives equal weight to both words. Jazz is music that has succeeded in 
making virtuosity itself the very subject of aesthetics. 
 
                                                
23 Gumplowicz (1991). 
24 Berliner (1994). 
25 Or ‘being music’, to say it in a perhaps more accurate way. 
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